State v. Johnson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

LASHAWN YOUNG JOHNSON, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0078 PRPC
FILED 02-11-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2017-002885-001
The Honorable Chuck Whitehead, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow
Counsel for Respondent

Brown & Little PLC, Chandler
By Matthew O. Brown
Counsel for Petitioner
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell (Retired)1 and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Lashawn Young Johnson petitions this court to review the
summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Rule”) 32.1. Young
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) based on trial counsels’
failure to suppress involuntary oral and written statements made during an
interrogation. We grant review but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A jury convicted Johnson of first-degree murder, arson, theft
of a means of transportation, and abandonment or concealment of a dead
body based on the following facts.

¶3 After communicating with the victim through a dating profile
and texts, Johnson invited her to his home on the night she went missing.
State v. Johnson, 1 CA-CR 18-0735, 2020 WL 639192, at *1, ¶ 2 (Ariz. App.
Feb. 11, 2020) (mem. decision). The victim’s phone was powered off the next
morning, and the police later tracked the victim’s phone to a cell tower near
Johnson’s residence. Id. The day after the victim’s disappearance, Johnson
missed an appointment with his girlfriend and failed to respond to her
throughout the day. Id. at *1, ¶ 4. That evening, he asked his girlfriend to
pick him up in Tonopah. Id.

¶4 Some weeks later, Johnson invited his girlfriend for a hike in
Tonopah. Johnson, 1 CA-CR 18-0735, at *2, ¶ 5. While there, he directed them
to a trail and eventually, the two found a burnt-out car, where he spent a

1 The Honorable Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge of the Court of Appeals,
Division One (Retired), is authorized by the Chief Justice of the Arizona
Supreme Court to participate in the disposition of this decision pursuant to
the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 3, and Arizona Revised Statutes
§§ 12–145 to –147.

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Decision of the Court

couple of minutes alone. Id. Police later found the victim’s body in a shallow
grave near the car. Id. at *2, ¶ 6.

¶5 Police found the victim’s blood on a bed frame, kitchen table,
and kitchen wall in Johnson’s residence, as well as evidence of attempts to
clean up the blood. Johnson, 1 CA-CR 18-0735, at *2, ¶ 6. Johnson made calls
on recorded jail lines to both his wife and girlfriend, telling his girlfriend
that he had met the victim that night and later telling his wife that he “let
the liquor control [him]” and that he “just made a big mistake.” Id. at *2,
¶¶ 8, 10 (alteration in original). He also told his wife that he “made a bad
choice in life” and that he “was drinking and [expletive] just went to the
left.” Id. (alteration in original).

¶6 Police woke Johnson at 1:20 A.M. and told him he was going
to a medical examination, then shackled and handcuffed him in an
interrogation room. After being read his Miranda rights, Johnson repeatedly
conveyed he did not want to talk, but the police continued the interrogation
for six hours. The interrogation ended with the detectives asking Johnson
to write an apology letter to the victim’s family. He agreed and wrote a
series of letters in which he stated: “I am LaShawn Johnson wouldn’t kohw
how. To say how sorry I am Just Hope yall forgive me for waht I have
[unintelligible]” and “[i]t has [unintelligible] to be come a [unintelligible] I
am raelly sorry for take some one you love[.]” [errors in original]. Johnson,
1 CA-CR 18-0735, at *2, ¶ 9. Johnson, who has a low IQ, tried to hide one
letter in his pants and tossed the other in a trash can.

¶7 At sentencing, the court imposed a mandatory life sentence
for the murder, 3.5 years for the theft, 2.5 years for the arson, and 1.5 years
for the concealment of the body. Johnson, 1 CA-CR 18-0735, at *3, ¶ 13.
Johnson appealed, and we affirmed his convictions and sentences. Id. at *1,
¶ 1. Johnson petitioned for PCR, asserting IAC by trial counsel for their
failure to suppress the interrogation and letters. The superior court
summarily denied his petition, and Johnson petitioned for review. We have
jurisdiction under the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, Arizona
Revised Statutes §§ 13-4031 and -4239, and Criminal Rule 32.16.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance of counsel is
a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180, ¶ 4
(2017). The petitioner must show the superior court abused its discretion by
denying their PCR petition, State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 6 (App. 2021),
and we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180,

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¶ 4. A petitioner’s claim is subject to summary dismissal if the alleged facts
are unlikely to change the verdict. State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶ 11
(2016); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a).

¶9 To state a colorable IAC claim, the defendant must prove
deficient performance by counsel, which caused prejudice to their case.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz.
562, 567, ¶ 21 (2006). The first prong requires the court to determine
“whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 272 (2014) (quotation
omitted). For the second prong, the defendant must show “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

¶10 Counsel’s decision on whether to move to suppress evidence
is a matter of trial strategy, which we review only to determine whether he
or she had some reasoned basis for the choice made. State v. Nirschel, 155
Ariz. 206, 208-09 (1987). Johnson presents strong evidence that his
statements during the police interrogation were involuntary. But Johnson
failed to provide evidence, such as affidavits, explaining counsels’ basis for
not suppressing the interrogation. See State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 445, ¶ 12
(App. 2013) (“A purportedly strategic decision is not objectively reasonable
when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a
reasonable choice between them.” (quotation omitted)). We also note that
trial counsel affirmatively used some of Johnson’s statements in his defense.
With just the record from the trial, we lack evidence to show that counsels’
decision was tactical rather than the result of “ineptitude, inexperience or
lack of preparation.” See State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984). Thus,
trial counsels’ performance cannot be assessed without more evidence.

¶11 Regardless of performance, however, Johnson failed to raise
a colorable claim because he did not show prejudice to his case. Bennett, 213
Ariz. at 567, ¶ 21 (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). Even if Johnson’s alleged
involuntary statements had been suppressed, the State presented
overwhelming evidence inculpating him, including the victim’s blood at his
residence, his knowledge of the location of the victim’s car and grave, the
victim’s presence in his residence on the night of her disappearance, and
Johnson going to the vicinity of the gravesite the next day. Johnson, 1 CA-CR
18-0735, at *1-2, ¶¶ 2, 4-6; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 113 (Substantial
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt provides grounds for

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finding no prejudice as the remaining evidence outweighs any possible
acquittal.); State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 543 (1985) (same). Further,
Johnson’s statements in recorded jail calls were duplicative of his
statements during the interrogation. As a result, even if trial counsel had
successfully suppressed Johnson’s statements, much of the same
information would have still been presented to the jury, which convicted
him on the evidence before it.

¶12 Johnson failed to show a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different had the interrogation been
suppressed. Thus, he failed to present a colorable IAC claim, and the court
did not err by summarily dismissing the PCR petition.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We grant review but deny relief.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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